From The Father of Cartesian Empiricism: Robert Desgabets on the physics and metaphysics of blood transfusion

 

8.3
From Metaphysics to Physics to expérience:
Cartesian Empiricism
Descartes more than once remarks that the role of experiment is to provide
demonstrations of the first principles or truths of physics by connecting them to the
way God actually made the world. In Part IV of his Discourse on Method he says:
But I must also admit that the power of nature is so ample and so vast, and the principles
so simple and so general, that I notice hardly any particular effect of which I do not know
at once that it can be deduced from the principles in many different ways; and my greatest
difficulty is usually to discover in which of these ways it depends upon them. I know no other means to discover this than by seeking further observations whose outcomes vary
according to which of these ways provides the correct explanation.49
In Part III, Article 46 of Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy he says:
For, seeing that these parts could have been regulated by God in an infinity of diverse ways; experience alone should teach us which of all these ways He chose. That is why we are nowat liberty to assume anything we please, provided that everything we shall deduce from it
is
{entirely} in conformity with experience.50
The idea is that human reason alone cannot discover how God chose to create the world—for the possible ways that reason can conceive exceed the one actual world that the senses come into contact with. The appeal to experience and observation is what delimits the merely conceivable, possible ways to the actual one, and so plays a necessary role in scientific knowledge. We must appeal to experience in order to
find our way back from effects to their causes.
A similar idea runs throughout Desgabets’ Supplement:
He [Descartes] founds the laws of nature for physics only upon the simple supposition that God, in creating the world, put as much movement in the totality of matter as is found there
at present, which we know from experience: this is sufficient for Descartes to deduce the
formation and nature of all things that make up the visible world, in reasoning always from
the cause to effects with consequences similar to those of mathematics. [author’s
emphasis]51
x
x

Marxism and Natural Sciences by Y.M. Uranovsky

 Natural science has to do with a relatively changeable nature ; on the one hand, as a result of the industrial activity of many generations, on the other hand (as the further development of science has shown) as a result of man's action upon it through the medium of investigation of observed processes.

The essence of the processes of nature cannot be understood without taking man's practical activity into account, which depends on the condition of productive forces and social construction. Only by starting from the practice of social life (industry, classes, social conditions) can human nature be understood as a part of nature as a whole, not only in the sense that man's psychology and ideas show their class essence, but in the sense of taking account of those natural (biological) changes to which he is subjected, when, in the process of changing reality, he also changes himself.

The method established by Marx spells the doom of naturalism in all its variations which looks on human society and man as an ordinary "child" of nature : the socio-power school (Podolinsky, Ostwald) ; the geo-political (Rutzel, G. E. Graf, etc.) ; every kind of bio-sociological school, starting with social-Darwinism, from Karl Kautsky's attempts to supplement Marx with a doctrine of the instincts as the starting-point for the analysis of social relationships, or the efforts of the Austro-Marxists to correct Marx by the teaching of Freud, explaining religion and culture by biological factors, right down to the philosophy of modern fascism (O. Spann) which tries to base itself on a biological theory of completeness and a doctrine of races in the organic world.

Marx breaks down all kinds of teaching on freedom of will by showing that social being determines social consciousness and in this way extends the objective method to the study of the most complex social phenomena.

In place of inconsistent, abstract, materialist monism (Spinoza, French eighteenth-century materialism, Feuerbach), Marx lays the firm foundations for a materialist monism which is not abstract, but concrete, dialectical, consistent, taking account of the specific nature of human society, of all the inner connections between nature and man in their historical development. Marx gives a method and an outlook in which the dialectic of nature and the dialectic of history are indissolubly connected together.

In Marx's views the historical primacy of nature is not in any way broken. Even before the triumph of evolutionist ideas Marx establishes the following premises : the theory of creation is destroyed, as is shown by the natural sciences (geognosis) ; nature develops, it is in process of becoming even before the appearance of man ; the development of nature goes spontaneously, is immanent, selfgenerated ; the organic world (and man) arose through generatio æquivoca ; life has not always existed as Thomson, Helmholtz and other representatives of the "absurd doctrine" of panspermy uphold. It follows that Marx understands this generatio æquivoca not as being the conception and birth of higher organisms without the intermediary of seed and parents (the mediæval form of this doctrine of generatio æquivoca, spontanea aut primaria), but in the sense of self-movement, selfdevelopment, i.e. in the sense which is in accordance with the chemical theory of the origin of life and the evolutionary theory of the origin of man, established within a decade and a half by Darwin's theory.

In a deep internal connection with these new views of the object of the natural sciences, of nature, Marx develops an absolutely new outlook on the science of nature, on natural science.

Even in the works belonging to the Holy Family Marx analyses, with greater power and depth than any of his predecessors (Bacon, Spinoza, the French materialists and philosophers of the age of enlightenment), the cultural-historical and social significance of natural science. Marx reproaches the philosophers for not taking into account the role and importance of the natural sciences. Natural science is not an external factor of usefulness for man or a chance factor of enlightenment. It is internally bound up with the most essential form of human activity, with practice, with industry, with the development of labour.

Industry is a practical relationship of man to nature, natural science, a "theoretical relationship". Industry is the basic form of practice, natural science, the foundation of human science. Industry discloses the real powers of man, and natural science is such a "real power", "a potential of production". Marx establishes the empirical origin and practical function of natural science and apportions a very important social role to natural science.

It follows that the power of Marx's analysis, surpassing all that had hitherto been written on the importance of the natural sciences, is determined by the fact that Marx knew how to generalise with genius the objective data of the epoch. Marx did not invent theories but summed up the experience of history and modern life. He often refers to the "gifts of science" which Davy, Liebig and others made to humanity.

Wreck of the martian observer

 

A world with no up nor down

  

A world with no up nor down

What would you do, if tomorrow, you found out that the world that we all think that we know turned out to be false? And what does it really mean for something to be true or false? What if the story that you have been spoonfed turns out to not exist? What is existence! What is truth? Can anybody know?Imagine a world with neither up nor down. this is the world of astronauts. this is the world that we live in. to a certain extent, the flat earthers are correct. Their perspective is self-consistent, and is it not true that a curved surface appears to be a line close up? Why do we call one ☝ direction up or down? Who knows? are people in space actually moving?

From Physics by Aristotle

  

04:54 minutes left to register for free

when the objects of an inquiry, in any department, have principles, conditions, or elements, it is through acquaintance with these that knowledge, that is to say scientific knowledge, is attained. For we do not think that we know a thing until we are acquainted with its primary conditions or first principles, and have carried our analysis as far as its simplest elements. Plainly therefore in the science of Nature, as in other branches of study, our first task will be to try to determine what relates to its principles.

The natural way of doing this is to start from the things which are more knowable and obvious to us and proceed towards those which are clearer and more knowable by nature; for the same things are not 'knowable relatively to us' and 'knowable' without qualification. So in the present inquiry we must follow this method and advance from what is more obscure by nature, but clearer to us, towards what is more clear and more knowable by nature.

Now what is to us plain and obvious at first is rather confused masses, the elements and principles of which become known to us later by analysis. Thus we must advance from generalities to particulars; for it is a whole that is best known to sense-perception, and a generality is a kind of whole, comprehending many things within it, like parts. Much the same thing happens in the relation of the name to the formula. A name, e.g. 'round', means vaguely a sort of whole: its definition analyses this into its particular senses. Similarly a child begins by calling all men 'father', and all women 'mother', but later on distinguishes each of them.

There was no up, there was no down, there was no side to side ~ Reina del Cid

 

Physics

 

‘Io son venuto al punto de la rota’ by Dante

 

‘Io son venuto al punto de la rota’

I have reached that point of the circuit

where the horizon, when the sun sets,

gives birth to the twin-ruled heavens,

and Love’s planet is remote from us,

because of the bright rays crossing her

slantwise, making of themselves a veil:

while the planet that solaces the frost

shows itself fully from the great arch

in which the Seven cast little shadow:

and yet not one of all the thoughts of love

with which I’m burdened, eases my mind

that seems so much harder than a stone,

gripped firmly by such images of stone.

Lifted high from Ethiopian sands,

those wandering winds that stir the air,

warmed now by the sun’s bright sphere;

cross the waves, carrying in their wake,

such deep fog, which, if nothing clears,

shuts in and darkens all this hemisphere;

and then dissolves, falls in white flakes

of freezing snow and a noxious sleet,

with which the air saddened weeps:

yet Love, who furls his net on high,

because of the power of the winds,

quits me not; such is the lovely lady,

the cruel one, he grants me for my lady.

Some birds chase the warmth, and flee

from European lands that never fail

to see the Seven ever-frozen stars;

the voices of the rest have fallen silent,

not to sing again until green spring,

unless some harshness makes them cry;

and all the creatures carefree by nature,

are freed of love, because their spirits

are wholly deadened by the wintry cold:

yet I feel love within me more than ever,

for those sweet thoughts are neither taken

from me, nor given me for lengths of time,

my lady grants to one with little time.

Leaves the power of the Ram engendered,

to adorn the world, fulfil their hour,

all the grass is dead, and all the green

the foliage of all the trees lost to us,

unless in laurel, in the pines or firs,

or frozen in some other evergreen;

so fierce and bitter is the season,

it kills all the flowers of the field,

that cannot tolerate the biting frost:

yet Love does not intend to draw

this cruel thorn from out my heart;

which I determine to bear forever

as long as I live, were that forever.

The streams run with smoke-laden water,

because of vapours deep underground,

that rise on high from the buried chasms;

so the path that pleased me on fine days

has turned into a river, and so will run

as long as winter’s dire assault shall last;

the earth is floored now as with enamel,

and the dull water changed to glass,

by cold air that seals it from without:

yet I’ve not deviated by a single step

from this war of mine, nor wish I to,

for if anguish is a kind of sweetness,

death must exceed every other sweetness.

Song, what will become of me, now,

in the sweet new season, in which love

rains down on earth from the whole sky.

if love lives on in me alone, despite

this frost, and yet is nowhere else alive?

Surely I will become a man of marble,

if this girl keeps within a heart of marble. 

Arisotle gravity

 

Ernst mach

 

Fractal

 

Volcano

 

Basic Information On Kaballah from jesus-is-saviour

 Basic Information On Kaballah

 

Question: "What is Kabbalah?"

 

Answer:  Kabbalah has many different ways of being spelled in English. It can be as you have spelled it, or one of the following: Kaballah, Qabalah, or Cabalah.

 

Kabbalah developed between the 6th and 13th centuries among Jews in Babylonia, Italy, Provence, and Spain. The word Kabbalah means "to receive" and refers to revelation from God received by Jews and passed to succeeding generations through oral tradition. The word was first used by mainstream Judaism but later came to refer to those who believed that only a select few were given the secret knowledge from God as to the "true" meaning of Scriptures.  Kabbalah uses occultic practices and is considered to be a cult.

 

Kabbalah resembles closely some of the beliefs held by the Greek Gnostics in that both groups held that only a select few were given deeper understanding or knowledge. Also, Kabbalah teaches that emanations from God did the work of creation rather than creation being directly from God. With each descending emanation, the emanation became further away from God. The final emanation took the personal form of angels. This would be like God created a lesser god, and that one then created a lesser god, and this kept happening until the end result were angels. This directly contradicts God's revelation of Himself in the Bible. In the Bible, God teaches that He is both separate from all of His creation and yet is directly accessible by those who come to Him through Jesus Christ.

 

Kabbalah does hold to the inspiration of Scripture, but does not seek the plain meaning of Scripture. The Kabbalah approach is mystical and very subjective, using such things as numerology to find "hidden" meaning. Through this method, almost any teaching that one desires could be "found" in Scripture. This goes against the very heart of communication. God provided Scripture that He might communicate with mankind and teach humanity of Himself. It is obvious that Scripture is meant to be taken at face value and Not mystical interpretation. This can be demonstrated by fulfilled prophecy. God said something would happen, and it happened as He said it would. The greatest example of this is the fulfillment of the prophecies concerning the first coming of Jesus Christ. The were hundreds of verses referring to His coming, and they were fulfilled literally (Isaiah 7:14; 9:6; Micah 5:2; Isaiah 53. This is why the Bible should be interpreted literally or normally.

 

Kabbalah even has a pantheistic characteristic. Pantheism is the idea that God and His creation are one. This of course is not what God has told us in the Bible. God created all that exists from nothing (the Hebrew word "bara"). Kabbalah says that creation is one of God's emanations - this is the pantheistic quality that Kabbalah has.

 

Of course I do not know why you have asked this question (what is Kabbalah?), but if you are seeking to know God and have a personal relationship with Him, look no further that Jesus Christ and the Bible. Jesus is God in the flesh, and He came to die for every person's sins. If an individual trusts in Christ -- that He is God (John 1:1-3) and paid for sin (Romans 8:3) -- then that person is forgiven and becomes a child of God (John 1:12).

An Egg drop

 

The Art of Shooting in the Dark Denice Frohman

 

The Art of Shooting in the Dark

Denice Frohman

after Pedro Pietri We were      nocturnal players,  Bats in ball,      & ever since Don Pedro said  There are Puerto Ricans      on the moon  The night is      my cousin      & the clustered stars  My cousin      & Saturn’s little ring of smoke      my second cousin  Though not the same ring      as a freshly snapped Medalla bottle      which My abuelo      also named Pedro      apparently liked too much  But back to the moon      the first rock      dollop of sugar   & slinging hoop in the dark      which we learned was a game       of approximation Less math      more muscle memory      less Mozart      more Machito  Like descarga      more riff      more wrist.  We set our eyes      on not seeing      but feeling a thing through, indeed From elbow to hip      wherever the orange lip might lead

PHYSICS by Aristotle - FULL Audio Book | Greatest Audio Books

 PHYSICS by Aristotle - FULL Audio Book | Greatest Audio Books

The Physics (Greek: Φυσικὴ ἀκρόασις or phusike akroasis; Latin: Physica, or Physicae Auscultationes, meaning "lectures on nature") of Aristotle is one of the foundational books of Western science and philosophy. As Martin Heidegger once wrote, The Physics is a lecture in which he seeks to determine beings that arise on their own, τὰ φύσει ὄντα, with regard to their being. Aristotelian "physics" is different from what we mean today by this word, not only to the extent that it belongs to antiquity whereas the modern physical sciences belong to modernity, rather above all it is different by virtue of the fact that Aristotle's "physics" is philosophy, whereas modern physics is a positive science that presupposes a philosophy.... This book determines the warp and woof of the whole of Western thinking, even at that place where it, as modern thinking, appears to think at odds with ancient thinking. But opposition is invariably comprised of a decisive, and often even perilous, dependence. Without Aristotle's Physics there would have been no Galileo. It is a collection of treatises or lessons that deal with the most general (philosophical) principles of natural or moving things, both living and non-living, rather than physical theories (in the modern sense) or investigations of the particular contents of the universe. The chief purpose of the work is to discover the principles and causes of (and not merely to describe) change, or movement, or motion (kinesis), especially that of natural wholes (mostly living things, but also inanimate wholes like the cosmos). In the conventional Andronichean ordering of Aristotle's works, it stands at the head of, as well as being foundational to, the long series of physical, cosmological and biological treatises, whose ancient Greek title, τὰ φυσικά, means "the [writings] on nature" or "natural philosophy"

Franklin

 

from physics by aristotle

Part 1

When the objects of an inquiry, in any department, have principles, conditions, or elements, it is through acquaintance with these that knowledge, that is to say scientific knowledge, is attained. For we do not think that we know a thing until we are acquainted with its primary conditions or first principles, and have carried our analysis as far as its simplest elements. Plainly therefore in the science of Nature, as in other branches of study, our first task will be to try to determine what relates to its principles.

The natural way of doing this is to start from the things which are more knowable and obvious to us and proceed towards those which are clearer and more knowable by nature; for the same things are not 'knowable relatively to us' and 'knowable' without qualification. So in the present inquiry we must follow this method and advance from what is more obscure by nature, but clearer to us, towards what is more clear and more knowable by nature.

Now what is to us plain and obvious at first is rather confused masses, the elements and principles of which become known to us later by analysis. Thus we must advance from generalities to particulars; for it is a whole that is best known to sense-perception, and a generality is a kind of whole, comprehending many things within it, like parts. Much the same thing happens in the relation of the name to the formula. A name, e.g. 'round', means vaguely a sort of whole: its definition analyses this into its particular senses. Similarly a child begins by calling all men 'father', and all women 'mother', but later on distinguishes each of them.

Part 2

The principles in question must be either (a) one or (b) more than one. If (a) one, it must be either (i) motionless, as Parmenides and Melissus assert, or (ii) in motion, as the physicists hold, some declaring air to be the first principle, others water. If (b) more than one, then either (i) a finite or (ii) an infinite plurality. If (i) finite (but more than one), then either two or three or four or some other number. If (ii) infinite, then either as Democritus believed one in kind, but differing in shape or form; or different in kind and even contrary.

A similar inquiry is made by those who inquire into the number of existents: for they inquire whether the ultimate constituents of existing things are one or many, and if many, whether a finite or an infinite plurality. So they too are inquiring whether the principle or element is one or many.

Now to investigate whether Being is one and motionless is not a contribution to the science of Nature. For just as the geometer has nothing more to say to one who denies the principles of his science-this being a question for a different science or for or common to all-so a man investigating principles cannot argue with one who denies their existence. For if Being is just one, and one in the way mentioned, there is a principle no longer, since a principle must be the principle of some thing or things.

To inquire therefore whether Being is one in this sense would be like arguing against any other position maintained for the sake of argument (such as the Heraclitean thesis, or such a thesis as that Being is one man) or like refuting a merely contentious argument-a description which applies to the arguments both of Melissus and of Parmenides: their premisses are false and their conclusions do not follow. Or rather the argument of Melissus is gross and palpable and offers no difficulty at all: accept one ridiculous proposition and the rest follows-a simple enough proceeding.

We physicists, on the other hand, must take for granted that the things that exist by nature are, either all or some of them, in motion which is indeed made plain by induction. Moreover, no man of science is bound to solve every kind of difficulty that may be raised, but only as many as are drawn falsely from the principles of the science: it is not our business to refute those that do not arise in this way: just as it is the duty of the geometer to refute the squaring of the circle by means of segments, but it is not his duty to refute Antiphon's proof. At the same time the holders of the theory of which we are speaking do incidentally raise physical questions, though Nature is not their subject: so it will perhaps be as well to spend a few words on them, especially as the inquiry is not without scientific interest.

The most pertinent question with which to begin will be this: In what sense is it asserted that all things are one? For 'is' is used in many senses. Do they mean that all things 'are' substance or quantities or qualities? And, further, are all things one substance-one man, one horse, or one soul-or quality and that one and the same-white or hot or something of the kind? These are all very different doctrines and all impossible to maintain.

For if both substance and quantity and quality are, then, whether these exist independently of each other or not, Being will be many.

If on the other hand it is asserted that all things are quality or quantity, then, whether substance exists or not, an absurdity results, if the impossible can properly be called absurd. For none of the others can exist independently: substance alone is independent: for everything is predicated of substance as subject. Now Melissus says that Being is infinite. It is then a quantity. For the infinite is in the category of quantity, whereas substance or quality or affection cannot be infinite except through a concomitant attribute, that is, if at the same time they are also quantities. For to define the infinite you must use quantity in your formula, but not substance or quality. If then Being is both substance and quantity, it is two, not one: if only substance, it is not infinite and has no magnitude; for to have that it will have to be a quantity.

Again, 'one' itself, no less than 'being', is used in many senses, so we must consider in what sense the word is used when it is said that the All is one.

Now we say that (a) the continuous is one or that (b) the indivisible is one, or (c) things are said to be 'one', when their essence is one and the same, as 'liquor' and 'drink'.

If (a) their One is one in the sense of continuous, it is many, for the continuous is divisible ad infinitum.

There is, indeed, a difficulty about part and whole, perhaps not relevant to the present argument, yet deserving consideration on its own account-namely, whether the part and the whole are one or more than one, and how they can be one or many, and, if they are more than one, in what sense they are more than one. (Similarly with the parts of wholes which are not continuous.) Further, if each of the two parts is indivisibly one with the whole, the difficulty arises that they will be indivisibly one with each other also.

But to proceed: If (b) their One is one as indivisible, nothing will have quantity or quality, and so the one will not be infinite, as Melissus says-nor, indeed, limited, as Parmenides says, for though the limit is indivisible, the limited is not.

But if (c) all things are one in the sense of having the same definition, like 'raiment' and 'dress', then it turns out that they are maintaining the Heraclitean doctrine, for it will be the same thing 'to be good' and 'to be bad', and 'to be good' and 'to be not good', and so the same thing will be 'good' and 'not good', and man and horse; in fact, their view will be, not that all things are one, but that they are nothing; and that 'to be of such-and-such a quality' is the same as 'to be of such-and-such a size'.

Even the more recent of the ancient thinkers were in a pother lest the same thing should turn out in their hands both one and many. So some, like Lycophron, were led to omit 'is', others to change the mode of expression and say 'the man has been whitened' instead of 'is white', and 'walks' instead of 'is walking', for fear that if they added the word 'is' they should be making the one to be many-as if 'one' and 'being' were always used in one and the same sense. What 'is' may be many either in definition (for example 'to be white' is one thing, 'to be musical' another, yet the same thing be both, so the one is many) or by division, as the whole and its parts. On this point, indeed, they were already getting into difficulties and admitted that the one was many-as if there was any difficulty about the same thing being both one and many, provided that these are not opposites; for 'one' may mean either 'potentially one' or 'actually one'.